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Abstract—Meta learning algorithms have been widely applied
in many tasks for efficient learning, such as few-shot image
classification and fast reinforcement learning. During meta train-
ing, the meta learner develops a common learning strategy, or
experience, from a variety of learning tasks. Therefore, during
meta test, the meta learner can use the learned strategy to
quickly adapt to new tasks even with a few training samples.
However, there is still a dark side about meta learning in
terms of reliability and robustness. In particular, is meta learning
vulnerable to adversarial attacks? In other words, would a well-
trained meta learner utilize its learned experience to build
wrong or likely useless knowledge, if an adversary unnoticeably
manipulates the given training set? Without the understanding
of this problem, it is extremely risky to apply meta learning in
safety-critical applications. Thus, in this paper, we perform the
initial study about adversarial attacks on meta learning under
the few-shot classification problem. In particular, we formally
define key elements of adversarial attacks unique to meta learning
and propose the first attacking algorithm against meta learning
under various settings. We evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed attacking strategy as well as the robustness of several
representative meta learning algorithms. Experimental results
demonstrate that the proposed attacking strategy can easily break
the meta learner and meta learning is vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. The implementation of the proposed framework will be
released upon the acceptance of this paper.
Index Terms—Meta Learning, Robustness, Adversarial Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks have achieved extraordinary accom-
plishments in numerous domains such as computer vision [1]
and natural language processing [2]. To achieve satisfying per-
formance, they usually require large-scale training data. There-
fore, learning efficiently and effectively with small data has
become one desirable property for modern machine learning
techniques. Meta learning (or learning to learn) algorithms [3],
[4] have been widely used to improve the efficiency of learning
new tasks. Meta learning models are often composed of two
nested parts, a meta learner and an adapted learner. Generally
speaking, a meta learner is trained on a lot of learning tasks
to build a common learning strategy to solve these tasks. In
each task, the meta learner produces an adapted learner which
works at the level of specific task such as an image classifier or
an object detector. During the meta-test phase, a meta learner
generalizes its learning strategy to quickly tackle new tasks,
only based on a few teaching episodes.
The success of meta learning algorithms has encouraged
their applications in many safety-critical tasks, including face
identification [5], [6], object detection [7], [8] and robotics
imitation learning [9]. However, the reliability and robust-
ness issues of meta learning algorithms have seldom been
investigated and evaluated, which exposes the applications
of meta learning to highly potential risk, especially with the
existence of adversarial attackers. The concept of adversarial
attack or adversarial example was originally proposed by [10]
and [11], which focus on deep neural networks (DNNs) for
image classification problems. These adversarial examples are
manually crafted images which have imperceptible difference
with clean images but can mislead the DNN models to give
totally wrong prediction. Similar phenomena were also found
in other data domains, including graph domain [12]–[14], and
language processing [15]. The risk and concern of applying
DNNs models in safety-critical missions under adversarial
attacks have been revealed and highlighted such that more
efforts have been paid on improving their robustness. However,
the robustness of meta learning approaches against adversarial
attack is still an open question and there is a pressing need to
bridge this gap.
In this work, we are devoted to studying the adversarial
robustness issues of meta learning with the focus on their
application in few-shot classification problems. Specifically,
we concentrate on attacking the meta learners, instead of the
adapted learners. Since a meta learner acts as a function to
output a good classification model based on a small teaching
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
01
67
2v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
 Se
p 2
02
0
dataset, we ask the question: if an attacker slightly manipulates
the teaching data of a meta learner, does the meta learner
still produce a reliable classifier? Compared to traditional
attacks, the meta learning attacks face unique challenges. First,
traditional attacks aim to mislead the machine learning model
itself to give wrong prediction on the adversarially perturbed
samples. While, meta attacks proposed in this work target
on letting the meta learner produce a “malicious” machine
learning model. This malicious model might have overall
bad generalization to any unseen test samples or misclassify
some specific items to a different class even when the test
samples are well protected and not adversarial. In essence,
the meta attacks can have much more severe consequences
than traditional attacks on individual machine learning mod-
els. Second, to achieve attacking on unseen test samples is
a challenging goal since it will require the generalization
ability of the attacking strategy that could further uncover
the vulnerability and unreliability of meta learning. Third, the
concept of “unnoticeable” perturbation in meta learning needs
to be redefined because the input of the meta learner is usually
a sample set instead of an individual sample. For instance, in
the case of few-shot image classification problems as showed
in Fig. 1, the input of a meta learner is a set of images. In this
case, in addition to guaranteeing small sample perturbation,
we should also manage to attack the meta learner by fewest
number of perturbed samples. Last but not least, the meta
learning models might have intrinsically different architectures
compared with DNNs models. Popular meta learning models
include (1) optimization-based methods like MAML [3]; (2)
model-based methods such as SNAIL [16] and (3) metric-
based models like Prototypical Net [17]. These models have
very heterogeneous designs which brings in further difficulty
for a systematic evaluation on their robustness.
With the establishment of these differences and challenges
for attacking meta learning algorithms, we have demonstrated
that dedicated efforts are desired to investigate the robustness
of meta learning algorithms. In this work, we make an at-
tempt for such investigation and our key contributions can be
summarized as follows:
• For the first time, we formally define the key elements for
attacking meta learning algorithms, including adversarial
goal and unnoticeable perturbation;
• We provide a new formulation of the objective function
for meta attack with both targeted and non-targeted
attacks under newly defined perturbation constraint;
• A novel meta attack algorithm MetaAttacker is proposed
to optimize the proposed objective function such that
adversarial input set can be efficiently computed for
diverse and complicated victim model structures;
• We systematically evaluate the reliability and robust-
ness of meta learning through different meta learning
frameworks including MAML, SNAIL and Prototypical.
Extensive experiments show that the proposed attacking
algorithm can easily break the meta learner. It suggests
that meta learning approaches are vulnerable to the pro-
Fig. 1: For few-shot classification tasks, during the meta test
phase, an adversary can insert unnoticeable perturbation to one
training sample of Dtrain in the meta test task T itest, causing
the adapted model which is trained on Dadv with much lower
accuracy.
posed meta attack, which reveals its risk in safety-critical
applications.
Outline of the Paper The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. We briefly review related works about meta learning
and adversarial attacks in Section II. In Section III, we intro-
duce the basics and notations in meta learning. In Section IV
we define the setup of the threat model while presenting the
meta attack algorithm in Section V. Experimental results are
presented in Section VI. Finally we conclude our work with
future work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In line with the focus of this work, we briefly introduce the
related works about meta learning and adversarial attacks.
A. Meta Learning
There exist various ideas to construct the meta learning
models including Optimization-Based Meta Learner, Model-
Based Meta Learner and Metric-Based Meta Learner.
Optimization-based meta learners imitate the optimization
process of training a machine learning model. For instance,
Model-Agnostic Meta Learning (MAML) [3] learns a set of
hyperparameters for a gradient descent process. When facing
a new task, it can quickly adapt to a new classification model
by running gradient descent in only several steps.
Model-based meta learning models [16], [18] directly take
form as a neural network, usually a sequence model like
LSTM [19]. When facing a new task, the training samples
act as parameters of the neural network, and outputs the
predictions for test samples.
Metric-based meta learners learn the strategies to compare
whether two samples are from the same class. Typically,
this type of meta learner works with a DNN model which
learns the embeddings of both training and test images. Then,
they compare whether two images embeddings belong to the
same class, based on different metrics, such as similarity
functions [17], [20], [21], SVM classifiers [22] and ridge
regression model [23].
In this work, we choose one representative algorithm in each
category to explore our robustness characteristics, including
MAML [3], SNAIL [16] and Prototypical Networks [17], with
the hope to have an overview of the robustness performance
for different types of meta learners.
B. Adversarial Attacks
The notion of adversarial attacks or adversarial examples
of deep learning models was first introduced by [10], [11]
on the image domain. Specifically, for a well-trained image
classifier, an adversary can almost always generate unnotice-
able perturbations on given images, and fool the classifier to
make wrong predictions. The existence of adversarial exam-
ples demonstrates that deep learning models have non-robust
properties, and could be unreliable when applied on safety-
critical tasks. At the same time, adversarial attacks are also
founded in other domains, such as graph structured data [24],
[25] and text data [26], [27]. Typically, due to different
adversarial goals, adversary’s capacity and attacking phase,
different adversarial attacks methods can be categorized as
targeted and non-targeted attacks, and evasion and poisoning
attacks. In targeted attack, the adversary aims to induce the
classifier to give a specific label to the perturbed test sample
while in non-targeted attack, the adversary only wants the
classifier to predict incorrectly without specifying a label.
In evasion attacks, the model are fixed and usually have
good performance on benign testing samples. The adversary
crafts some fake samples that the classifier cannot recognize
correctly. Poisoning attacks allow an attacker to insert or
modify a small portion of fake samples in the training dataset.
They aim to cause failures of the trained classifier such as
poor accuracy or wrong prediction on some given test samples.
Regarding the robustness of meta learning algorithms, recent
works [28] and [29] show that the adapted model produced
by meta learner is not robust toward adversarial examples.
Note that the goal of meta attack in this work is unique to
meta learning that is different from that of [28], [29]. It
is more dangerous in the sense that we aim to destroy the
overall performance of the adapted model without seeing and
modifying the test samples.
III. META LEARNING BASICS AND NOTATIONS
In this section, we introduce key concepts, definitions and
notations for meta learning that we will use in this paper.
Generally, a meta-learning algorithm aims to learn a common
strategy, i.e., a meta learner, to solve a variety of similar tasks
TABLE I: Notations and Descriptions.
Notation Description
T itrain Meta-train Task i
T itest Meta-test Task i
fθ(·) Meta learner with parameters θ
DTtrain Training data of task T
DTtest Test data of task T
DTadv Adversarial data of task T
F (·;φ) Adapted model with parameters φ
T ∼ p(T ). In each task T (e.g. a few-shot classification
task), a well trained meta learner fθ with parameter θ utilizes
the training data DTtrain to produce an adapted model F (·;φ)
with the parameter φ. The adapted model is expected to have
good prediction performance on the unseen test data DTtest. We
denote such adaptation process as φ = fθ(DTtrain).
To learn a good learning strategy, the meta learner fθ needs
to be trained on many similar tasks T ∼ p(T ) where p(T )
denotes the distribution of tasks. Specifically, there will be a
training set DTtrain and a test set D
T
test associated with each task
T . The goal of meta training is to learn a meta learner fθ which
is able to produce an adapted model F (·;φ) incurring low
test error on DTtest across each task T . Formally, the objective
function of meta training can be described as:
min
θ
E
T ∼p(T )
(
E
x,y∼DTtest
L(F (x;φ), y)
)
s.t. φ = fθ(DTtrain)
(1)
where L(y′, y) denotes the loss with the prediction y′ and
ground truth label y. Note that in (1), the parameters θ of
the meta learner are the decision variable to be optimized.
In practice, it is usually trained on a finite set of training
tasks {T itrain, i = 1, 2, ...n1} while the performance of the
trained meta learner will be evaluated on a finite set of test
tasks {T itest, i = 1, 2, ...n2}. All notations and definitions are
summarized in Table I.
IV. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we describe details about the key com-
ponents of our proposed threat model for meta learning
including the victim model, adversary’s goal and unnoticeable
perturbation.
A. Victim Meta Learner
Generally, different meta learning algorithms have unique
meta learner structures fθ. In this subsection, we briefly
introduce three representative victim meta learners we attempt
to attack in this work.
1) Optimization-Based Meta Learner: An optimization-
based meta learner such as MAML [3] typically simulates
the optimization process where the parameters of the adapted
model F ( · ;φ) are updated to achieve minimal loss on a task
T with associated training data DTtrain. For instance, MAML
produces an adapted model F ( · ;φ) by running m gradient
descent steps:
φ0 = θ − α ∇θL(θ)
...
φj = φj−1 − α ∇φj−1L(φj−1)
φ = φm where m ≥ 0
(2)
where α is the step size and the parameters θ of the meta
learner serve as the initialization of model F ( · ;φ). L(φj)
denotes the total training loss of model F (·;φj) on DTtrain:
L(φj) =
∑
(x,y)∈DTtrain
L(F (x;φj), y).
By minimizing the training loss, the meta learner hopes to
render a good model F (·, φ) with small error on the test
samples DTtest. The performance of the MAML model on a
task T relies on the model initialization θ and the gradients.
Later on, we will discuss how an attacker can manipulate the
training samples to mislead MAML to update with “malicious”
gradients.
2) Model-Based Meta Learner: Model-based meta learners
such as MANN [30] and SNAIL [16] work as DNN models,
which take inputs from DTtrain and directly output the adapted
model F (·;φ). For example, SNAIL [16] constructs an atten-
tion based sequential model which takes inputs from a series
of samples (x1, y1)...(xt, yt) and outputs the label prediction
for the last sample (xt, yt). Specifically, the first (t− 1) input
samples are from the training set DTtrain, and it outputs the
prediction for the t-th input, which is an upcoming test sample
in DTtest. For this type of meta learner, the training data D
T
train
acts as parameters of the adapted model. Compared to other
meta learning architectures, model-based meta learner is more
similar to traditional DNN models. In our experiments, we
choose the SNAIL [16] model as an example of the model-
based meta learners to present its robustness behavior.
3) Metric-Based Meta Learner: The metric-based meta
learners are usually composed of two parts, a DNN model
g(·, θ) for feature extraction which projects all the training
and test samples to a feature space, and a base classifier which
divides the feature space to different classes. For example, in
Prototypical Networks [17], when the meta leaner faces a task
T with training set DTtrain, in the embedding space, a nearest
neighbor classifier is build on the embedded feature vectors
{g(x; θ)|x ∈ DTtrain}. This classifier will make predictions for
test samples by feeding them into the feature space and the
base classifier. Take the Prototypical Net as an example, the
robustness of this meta learner will be decided by both the
DNN feature extractor and the base classifier.
B. Adversary’s Goal
In this work, the main goal of meta learning attacks (meta
attack) is to mislead the meta learner to produce “malicious”
models, which is different from traditional adversarial attacks
focusing on test examples. Therefore, we need to formally
redefine adversary’s goals for meta attack. In this work, we
study the robustness of meta learning for few-shot classifica-
tion under the white-box setting where the adversary has the
full knowledge of a trained meta learner, including the model
parameters and adaptation process. We allow an adversary
to manipulate a subset of the training set DTtrain. Under this
constraint, the adversary can construct an adversarial training
set DTadv which attempts to mislead the meta learner to produce
a malicious adapted model. In particular, we consider two
different types of adversarial goals to fool the meta learner
including untargeted attack and targeted attack.
1) Non-targeted Attack (Denial-of-Service Attack): In the
setting of non-targeted attack, the adversary aims to let the
adapted classifier F (·;φ′) have bad overall performance (low
accuracy) across the test samples from the data distribution of
the task T . This adversarial objective can be formulated as to
find an adversarial dataset DTadv that maximizes the test loss
of the adapted model:
maximize
DTadv
E
x,y∼DTtest
L(F (x;φ′), y)
s.t. φ′ = fθ(DTadv)
(3)
Under the risk of untargeted attacks, the meta learner might
build wrong or almost useless knowledge. This attack also
called Denial-of-Service attack [31].
2) Targeted Attack: Different from the untargeted attack
which aims to degrade the overall performance for the task
T , the adversary under targeted attack takes certain subset
of test samples DTtarget ⊆ DTtest as the targeted samples and
aims to undermine the adapted model’s performance on these
targeted samples. Specifically, we consider all samples from
one specific class as targeted samples in a task T . In this way,
we are able to evaluate whether the meta learner can be misled
to produce an adapted model F (·;φ) which has a general
“wrong” concept for a given class. For example, a meta learner
can build the knowledge about “what is a cat” after seeing a
few teaching samples of cats. However, our adversary aims to
let the adapted model misclassify any unseen cat images by
attacking the meta learner. In this way, the adapted model’s
knowledge about the cat is destroyed. Formally, for a target
class t, we define our targeted attack’s objective as:
maximize
DTadv
E
x,y∼DTtest,y=t
[L(F (x;φ′), y)]
s.t. φ′ = fθ(DTadv)
(4)
In fact, we empirically show that an attacker can break
the adapted model’s knowledge on one class even by only
modifying teaching samples in another class. For example, an
attacker perturbs a few samples of dog images, but the adapted
classifier can fail to recognize cat images. This phenomenon
provides strong evidence on the unreliability of meta learning
models. More details can be found in the experiment section.
3) Surrogate Test Loss: In the objectives of untargeted
attacks (3) and targeted attacks (4), the attacker needs to have
knowledge about test samples DTtest which is not realistic in real
world scenarios. Therefore, we propose to use the empirical
training loss on training samples DTtrain to approximate the test
loss. When doing meta adversarial attack, we hope our adapted
model from perturbed train set can generalize the “malicious”
knowledge to unseen test samples. Formally, we unify the
untargeted and targeted objectives as follows:
maximize
DTadv
∑
x,y∈DTtrain
[L(F (x;φ′), y)]
s.t. φ′ = fθ(DTadv)
(5)
where DTtrain is actually D
T
train,y=t in the targeted case. The
generalization of attack from DTtrain to D
T
test further reveals the
unreliability of meta learning as showed in the experiments.
C. Unnoticeable Perturbation
Typically, in an adversarial attack scenario, the attacker is
allowed to modify the input data in a sneaky and unnoticeable
way. With the goal of meta attack, the unnoticeable pertur-
bation is also a valid concern but how to define unnoticeable
perturbations in such setting has not been established yet. In
this work, we provide two principles, i.e., perturbed samples
budget and perceptual similarity, to ensure that the perturbed
dataset DTadv is similar to D
T
train.
1) Perturbed Samples Budget: The adversary is required
to perturb as few samples as possible to achieve the adversarial
goal because fewer fake samples an adversary injects to the
system, the less likely this attack can be detected. We denote
xadv ∈ DTadv as a perturbed sample in the perturbed set DTadv
and x = clean(xadv) as the corresponding clean sample.
Formally, we require the perturbed samples budget is limited
by k: ∑
xadv∈DTadv
1(xadv 6= clean(xadv)) ≤ k (6)
2) Perceptual Similarity: In each individual perturbed sam-
ple, we require that the perturbed image is perceptually similar
to the clean image. In other words, our added perturbation
is indistinguishable for human. We manage to achieve this
criterion by limiting the perturbation as follow:
||xadv − clean(xadv)|| ≤ , ∀xadv ∈ DTadv. (7)
V. META ATTACK
Based on the adversary’s goal and capacity as described in
the last section, the meta attack problem can be defined as the
follows:
0In image domain, we usually use lp norm difference to define the
perceptual dissimilarity between two images. In the future parts of this work,
we implicitly denote || · || as l∞ norm.
Problem 1: Given a well-trained meta learner fθ, a new
unseen learning task T , the corresponding training samples
DTtrain and perturbation budget (k, ), we aim to find an adver-
sarial training set DTadv by solving the following optimization
problem:
maximize
DTadv
∑
x,y∈DTtrain
[L(F (x;φ′), y)]
s.t.

φ′ = fθ(DTadv)∑
xadv∈DTadv 1(x
adv 6= clean(xadv)) ≤ k,
||xadv − clean(xadv)|| ≤ , ∀xadv ∈ DTadv.
(8)
In other words, in Problem 1, we aim to perturb at most k
samples within training data set DTtrain with `∞ norm pertur-
bation constraint  such that the resulting adversarial data set
DTadv attacks the meta learner fθ which unexpectedly produces
an adapted model F (·;φ′) incurring maximal loss value on the
targeted samples DTtrain. Selecting the samples to be perturbed
in DTtrain is a combinatorial optimization problem and we
provide a greedy algorithm for such selection process as
showed in Alg. 2. Before introducing that, we first describe the
meta attacking algorithm given a selected set DTselect ⊂ DTtrain
as showed in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1: Generate adversarial set for a given selected
set
1: Input: A new task T and the associated training set
DTtrain, a given selected set D
T
select, `∞ norm constrain 
and attacking step K
2: Output: adversarial sample set DTadv
3: Initialize x0i = xi, ∀xi ∈ DTselect
4: for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 do
5: DTadv = {DTtrain ∩DTselect} ∪DTselect
6: φk = fθ(D
T
adv)
7: Ltotal(φk) =
∑
(x,y)∈DTtrain L(F (x, φ
k), y)
8: for xki ∈ DTselect do
9: gki = ∇xki Ltotal(φk)
10: xk+1i = Clipxi,
(
xki + α sign(g
k
i )
)
11: end for
12: end for
13: Return: DTadv
A. Generating Adversarial Samples for A Given Selected Set
In each iterative step, the adversarial sample set DTadv is
first constructed by replacing the corresponding clean samples
in DTtrain with D
T
select (line 5). Based on D
T
adv, the meta
learner produces an adapted model F (·;φk) with parameters
φk = fθ(D
T
adv) (line 6). A total loss value Ltotal(φk) of model
F (·;φk) is computed based on the clean training set DTtrain
(line 7). To maximize this loss, we perturb each sample xki in
the selected set through a projected gradient ascent step (line
9 and 10). The Clip function denotes the projection function
which projects the perturbed sample xki to the -neighborhood
of clean sample xi, i.e., B(xi) : {x′ : ||x′ − xi|| ≤ }. The
gradient is calculated with respect to the sample xki through
the chain rule:
∇xki Ltotal(φ
k) =
∂Ltotal(φk)
∂φk
∂φk
∂xki
=
∂Ltotal(φk)
∂φk
∂fθ(D
T
adv)
∂xki
.
(9)
Note that the computation of ∂Ltotal(φ
k)
∂φk
is relatively easy but
the computation of the Jacobian matrix ∂fθ(D
T
adv)
∂xki
is much more
challenging because the adapted model φk has complicated
and distinct dependency on sample xki ∈ DTadv according to
the structure of meta learner fθ.
To provide more insights, we take Model-Agnostic Meta
Learning (MAML) model [3] as an example. Taking the input
data set DTadv, MAML will produce a new model φ = φm after
m iterative gradient updates as described in (2). Therefore,
the adapted model fθ(DTadv) will have dependencies on the
input data xi ∈ DTadv through each intermediate model φj
where j = 0, 1, . . . ,m as showed in the computation graph in
Figure 2. As a result, the Jacobian matrix is calculated through
the backward propagation from φm to each input xi in each
step j and the final result will be the summation of matrices
calculated from each backward path. Computationally, this
requires backward passes through higher order derivatives,
which is supported by standard deep learning libraries such
as PyTorch autograd [32].
Fig. 2: Computational graph for Jacobian matrix computation
∂fθ(D
T
adv)
∂xki
The red arrows indicate the backward propagation
through the meta learning adaptation steps.
This higher-order gradient attacking algorithm will help
adversarial examples to mislead the MAML model to produce
“malicious” parameter updates for multiple gradient steps. We
note that this higher order gradient calculation is necessary
and as the MAML implements more updating steps, one-
order gradient attacks cannot result in significant influence on
the adapted model. In our experimental results, we will show
that the our proposed algorithm can effectively decrease the
MAML’s robustness with multiple updating steps.
Different from MAML, for SNAIL [16] and Prototypical
Networks [17], where the meta learner is one DNN model or
the combination of a DNN + Nearest-Neighbor classifier, one-
order gradient attack is sufficient to find the most influential
adversarial set.
B. Search for the Optimal Adversarial Set
In corresponding to the definition of unnoticeable perturba-
tion in Section IV-C, we will need to constrain the perturbation
budget to only select at most k samples to perturb in DTtrain.
Note that how to choose the most influential set for adversarial
attack also can affect the attacking performance. However,
the searching process will be costly if the data set DTtrain is
large because it requires to search over C(|A|, k) combina-
tions. Therefore, we provide a greedy algorithm to obtain
an approximate solution to keep adding the most dangerous
adversarial sample into the attacking bag. It is briefly shown
in Algorithm 2. In each iteration i, we choose one sample
xopt from DTtrain\Si−1 which incurs the largest adversarial loss
Ltotal when added into the set S′. In this way, we iteratively
enlarge our candidate set by constructing the most adversarial
1-set, 2-set until k-set perturbation.
Algorithm 2: Search the perturbation set
Input: Clean train set DTtrain, perturbed sample budget k,
and `∞ norm constrain 
Output: Perturbation Set DTselect
1 Initialize i← 0, S0 = ∅
2 while i < k do
3 i = i+1
4 for each x ∈ DTtrain\Si−1 do
5 S′ = {x} ∪ Si−1
6 DTinput = {DTtrain ∩ S′} ∪ S′
7 Generate adversarial perturbation on set DTinput
with Alg. 1 and store the adversarial loss Ltotal
8 Choose the sample xopt which incurs largest Ltotal
9 Si = Si−1 ∪ {xopt}
10 Return: Sk
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we evaluate the proposed meta attack algo-
rithm MetaAttacker against three popular meta learning algo-
rithms, including MAML [3], SNAIL [16] and Prototypical
Networks [17], under different settings as we introduced in
Section IV. Through the experiments, we aim to answer the
following questions: (1) Can we successfully attack the meta
learner by inserting unnoticeable perturbations under different
perturbation budgets? (2) How do the hyperparameters of meta
learner influence its robustness and reliability against meta
learning attack? and (3) Will different meta learners present
different robustness behaviors to adversarial attacks? Next, we
first discuss the full results on MAML [3] model to gain
an overview understanding on its robustness under different
settings. Then, we implement our attacks on SNAIL [16] and
Prototypical Networks [17] to study the difference between
different meta learning structures.
A. Experimental Setup
Datasets. To evaluate the performance and robustness of
existing meta-learning algorithms, we apply the proposed
attacking framework to few shot learning problems on two
the most common used benchmark datasets including Om-
niglot [33] and MiniImagenet [4] datasets. The Omniglot
dataset consists of 1,623 human-writing characters where each
character has 20 different images. The MiniImagenet dataset
consists of 100 classes with 600 samples of 8484 color
images per class. For both datasets, we report meta learning
performance and robustness performance under 5-way 5-shot
classification problems. In each 5-way 5-shot learning task, we
have 25 training samples in total (5 samples per class) and use
15 test samples per class to calculate the test accuracy. In the
evaluation phase, we report the average test accuracy across
100 meta-test tasks Ti = {DTitrain, DTitest} , i = 1, 2, ..., 100.
Unnoticeable Perturbation For the Omniglot dataset, it
consists of handwritten character images by pixel resolution
28 × 28 in the range [0, 1], which is similar to MNIST [34].
Thus, we define the perturbation in this dataset to be un-
noticeable by constraining l∞ norm not larger than 0.3:
||xadv − x|| ≤ 0.3. For Mini-Imagenet dataset whose image
size is 84× 84, we constrain the unnoticeable perturbation by
limiting ||xadv − x|| ≤ 8/255. Generally, for a 5-way 5-shot
classification problem, we will limit the perturbation budget
where the attacker cannot attack more than 1,2,3 or 5 images
out of these 25 images.
B. Experimental Results for MAML
1) Clean Performance.: For an illustration of our attack
on MAML, we choose the backbone model structure as a
DNN model with 4-layer Convolutional Neural Network as
used by [3] and [21]. As suggested by [3], fine-tuning step m
on a local training set DTtrain is one important hyperparameter
that influences the meta learner’s performance. Therefore, in
Table III, we report the model’s clean performance under
different settings of fine-tuning steps (m = 1, 5, 10). From
the clean performance in Table II, we can see that more fine-
tuning steps will help to improve the clean performances of
MAML in both Omniglot and Mini-ImageNet.
2) Non-targeted Attack Performance: We study the per-
formance of our non-targeted attacking algorithm which aims
to influence overall accuracy of the adapted classification
model as described in Section IV-B1. We evaluate the adapted
model’s average accuracy across 100 test tasks {Ti, i =
1, 2, ..., 100}. For each single task T , the adversary has the
access to manipulate all training images, which means that
TABLE II: Average test accuracy (in %) for MAML on
Omniglot and Mini-Imagenet. We list the performance for
1,5,10 fine-tuning steps of MAML adaptation during the test
phase.
F.T Step 1 Step 5 Step 10 Step
Omniglot 99.0 99.9 99.9
Mini-Imagenet 58.8 62.6 63.1
the accessible set A = DTtrain. However, it is only allowed to
modify no more than k = 1, 2, 3, 10 samples in DTtrain,
In order to validate the effect of our adversarial attack,
we compare our meta attack algorithm versus adding random
perturbations in the constrained unnoticeable space {xrand :
||xrand − x|| ≤ }, on random chosen samples of the training
set. In our experiments, we set the attacking step size α = 0.01
for Omniglot, α = 0.2/255 for Mini-Imagenet, and attacking
steps length l = 100. We report the average test accuracy
across 100 meta-test tasks. The detailed experimental results
on Mini-Imagenet and Omniglot are shown in Table III.
For the Mini-Imagenet dataset, the MAML meta-learner has
a clean performance with average accuracy around 60%, which
means there are some tests that the adapted classifier has low
accuracy (smaller than 40%). It is meaningless to attack the
cases where meta learner fails. Thus, in our experiments, we
select the successfully adapted test tasks in which the mini test
accuracy is over 55%. In addition to the attacking results under
different perturbation budgets, we also present two baseline
performance. Non-attack denotes the clean test performance of
MAML across all the selected tasks. Random F.T. means that
for each task T , we randomly initialize the model parameters
φ0, and do fine tuning from this randomized φ0. Since MAML
is essentially about to find a proper initialization for task T ,
we use Random F.T. to show the situation where the learning
process has no guide from MAML.
From Table III, we note that generating random noise on
random samples can hardly influence MAML’s performance.
For our proposed MetaAttacker attack on Mini-Imagenet, the
most-successful attacking case (modifying 10 samples when
MAML takes 1 step fine-tuning) reduces the average accuracy
from 63.3% to 16.2%. The most-difficult attacking setting
(modifying 1 sample under 10 steps fine-tuning) can also
reduce overall accuracy from 65.2% to 56.6%. For each case,
when there are about 10 out of 25 samples are modified,
the MAML adapted models’ performance is similar or below
Random F.T., which suggests that the guide or experience
from MAML under adversarial attacks becomes similar to
randomized initialization. On the Omniglot dataset, MAML
meta learner for 5-way 5-shot learning tasks can achieve very
high performance on clean inputs DTtrain (almost 99% average
test accuracy across test tasks). From the results on Table III,
we can see that an adversary is required to perturb at least 2
samples to reduce the meta learner performance by 2 ∼ 5%,
and 5 samples to reduce the performance by 20%. We note
TABLE III: Average testing accuracy of MAML adapted
models after MetaAttacker attack vs. Random attack on Mini-
Imagenet and Omniglot, when MAML takes 1, 5, 10 steps
fine-tuning. The perturbation budget is under 1, 2, 5 and 10
samples respectively.
Mini-Imagenet Dataset
F.T. Step 1 Step 5 Step 10 Step
Attack Method MetaAttacker Rand. MetaAttacker Rand. MetaAttacker Rand.
1 Sample 48.2 63.0 55.6 64.7 56.6 66.3
2 Samples 42.6 62.9 44.6 64.4 51.2 66.2
5 Samples 25.6 62.9 33.0 64.6 40.6 65.7
10 Samples 16.2 62.2 20.4 64.1 22.8 65.4
Non-attack 63.3 64.8 66.5
Random F.T. 23.4 23.4 27.5
Omniglot Dataset
F.T. Step 1 Step 5 Step 10 Step
Attack Method MetaAttacker Rand. MetaAttacker Rand. MetaAttacker Rand.
1 Sample 96.2 99.0 99.2 99.8 99.3 99.9
2 Samples 93.3 98.8 96.9 99.3 96.6 99.2
5 Samples 77.8 98.4 82.2 99.1 80.9 99.2
10 Samples 61.4 98.1 63.8 98.9 62.4 99.0
Non-attack 99.0 99.8 99.9
Random F.T. 46.6 52.6 54.4
that one intriguing property of the robustness of MAML is that
with the increase of the fine tuning steps, the meta learner’s
robustness is also improved.
3) Targeted Attack Performance: In this subsection, in-
stead of observing the meta learner’s overall robustness per-
formance, we focus on studying the robustness of meta learner
via a local view which locates to one single class for each
learning task. Specifically, we consider the setting where the
adversary aims to influence the model’s prediction on test
samples from a specific target class: y = target (recall our
discussion in Section IV-B2). Under this adversarial goal,
we further constrain that the adversary is only allowed to
manipulate training samples in one given class y = attack. In
our experiments, we consider the following two settings – (1)
Direct Attack: the adversary can manipulate samples from the
target class, i.e., target = attack; and (2) Influence Attack: the
adversary can only manipulate train samples from a different
class, i.e., target 6= attack. By studying meta learner’s manner
under the targeted attack, we can hopefully study the meta
learner’s safety manner in an inter-class level. For example,
we try to answer the question: can we perturb the training
samples in one class, but make the adapted model hardly
recognize samples in another class? Is it easier to attack
the adapted model performance when the adversary directly
inserts perturbation into the target class? In our experiments,
to evaluate the classification models’ performance on a specific
target class, for each mini task T , we list the “in class”
accuracy of the target class, or namely “recall” of the target
class. The recall represents the percentage of the correctly
classified test samples among all test samples in the targeted
class.
The results are shown in Figure 3. From the figure, we can
see that both direct attack and influence attack have achieved
the adversarial goal to influence the adapted models’ perfor-
mance on target classes. Overall, the direct attacks are more
powerful than influence attacks on most cases when the meta
learner takes 5 steps and 10 steps fine tuning, especially when
the allowed perturbation budgets are respectively large. When
the adversary is allowed to manipulate all 5 training samples in
the target class, he can reduce the in-class accuracy to around
10%, so the model can hardly recognize the test samples in
this targeted class. Remark that even though we perturbed
all 5 train samples in the target class, we still constrain the
perceptual similarity for them. When the adversary is not
allowed to directly perturb the train samples in the target
attack (influence attack), he can still mislead the meta learner
to have decreased accuracy for samples in the target class.
This attacking effect is most obvious when the meta learner
takes 1 step fine tuning. However, when meta learner takes
more steps of fine tuning, the effect from direct attack is more
powerful than influence attack.
C. Attacking Other Meta Learning Models
In addition to MAML, we also consider two other types of
meta learning models, including one model-based meta learner
SNAIL [16] and one metric-based meta learner Prototypical
Networks [17]. The sequential model for SNAIL is inherited
from the setting of the original work [16], which contains
two blocks of Temporal Convolutional layers and two causal
attention layers. The DNN model structures of Prototypical
Networks we are using are also inherited from the original
work in [17], which are composed of 4 convolutional blocks
with each block containing a 64-filter 33 convolution. For em-
pirical study for the meta learner’s robustness, we report their
non-targeted and targeted attacked performance in Omniglot
dataset since we have similar observations on Mini-Imagenet.
As shown in Figure 4a, both these two meta learner models are
also vulnerable to non-targeted adversarial attacks, and with
the increase of perturbation budgets, the average performance
drops significantly. While, for targeted attacks as shown in
Figures 4b and 4c, the SNAIL models are easy to be attacked
by both direct and influence attacks. However, for Prototypical
Networks, the direct attacks can result in huge performance
degradation for the target samples, but influence attacks can
hardly have impacts on the target samples.
D. Discussion
Traditionally, in classification tasks, our “perturbing train
set to influence test performance” is a data poisoning process.
For the non-targeted attack (Denial-of-Service attack), there
are existed data poisoning attacks [35], [36], which concentrate
on traditional machine learning models, such as linear Support
Vector Machine and linear regression models. For examples,
[35] generate clean poison on one training sample of MNIST
dataset, which increase 5% ∼ 15% error rate. In the deep
learning scenario, the data poisoning becomes much more
difficult because deep neural networks are usually trained on
large datasets with many training epochs. Thus, only poisoning
a few samples can hardly have large effect on the final trained
model. We note that there are some existing works, such
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3: Targeted attack performance on MAML meta learner, on Mini-Imagenet (top) and Omniglot (bottom)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4: Attack Performance on Different Meta Learning Models.
as [35], [37] which aim to let the trained model have wrong
prediction on a small set of test samples. For example, in [37],
the authors manage to flip the trained Inception [38] model’s
prediction on one targeted test sample from Imagenet with
57% successful rate by perturbing one random training sample.
For our proposed adversarial attack on meta learning, our
attacking can largely change the adapted DNN model’s overall
performance on unseen test samples by only perturbing a few
training images. We also show that attacking meta learner can
alter the adapted DNN’s prediction on all unseen test samples
in one targeted class. The generalization of attacking effect
also uncovers the vulnerability of meta learning algorithms
from a new perspective. Therefore, we can conclude that the
DNN model adapted from meta learning process is in more
danger under the risk of data poisoning. It is because the
meta learner only adapts on a few training samples, and has
a few tuning steps. The given meta learner structure will also
explicitly guide an attacker to insert the poisoned samples.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we first formally define the adversarial at-
tacks and robustness issues for meta learning algorithms. We
emphasize the existence of meta adversarial examples can be
dangerous in real world scenarios. In detail, we give new
definitions for adversarial goal and unnoticeable perturbations
for attacking meta learning algorithms. Based on our def-
inition for adversarial attacks for meta learning, we design
efficient attacking approaches to fulfill our goal and validate
our approach on different datasets for various meta learning
models. Our empirical studies show that the attack method
can result in significant performance drop for these meta
learning models. This study opens doors to the security issues
about meta learning. There are many directions needing further
investigations. First, our current attacking strategy focused on
the white-box setting and we would like to study strategies
for other settings such as the black-box setting. Second, we
aim to derive extensions of existing meta learning models to
become more robust against attacks. Finally, we will also try
to study this security issue for applications of meta learning
in other domains beyond the few-shot classification such fast
reinforcement learning [9] and meta machine translation [39].
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